Cost-reducing R&D in the presence of an appropriation alternative: an application to the natural resource curse 
Introduction
Empirical studies suggest that countries well-endowed with natural resources tend to experience slower economic development than their resource-poor counterparts (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 1997; 2001) 1 . This puzzle, the so-called natural resource curse, has resulted to dierent explanations.
2 The rst stream of research pertains to the Dutch disease and deindustrialization. It notes that resource abundance shifts factors of production out of sectors characterized by increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 1992; and Gylfason et al., 1999) . Another explanation emphasizes the role of institutions. The transmission channels for this stream can be distinguished into two: 1. centralized and 2. decentralized mechanisms. The centralized mechanism hypothesizes that when ruling elites are not benevolent, they tend to use resource income for personal gain instead of public good provision (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009 ). Meanwhile, the decentralized mechanism focuses on rent-seeking and conict among societal groups (Torvik (2002) , Wick and Bulte (2006) , Lane and Tornell (1996) , and Tornell and Lane (1999) ). Nonetheless, Mehlum et al. (2006) observed that when institutions are strong, more natural resources may eventually push aggregate income up.
These propositions on why there is a resource curse usually follow a crowdingout logic. An abundance or dependence on natural resources crowds out a growth-enhancing activity. This present study addresses an additional channel through which natural resource wealth may aect income and social welfare. It argues that an increase in the amount of natural resources reduces the incentives of entrepreneurial groups to engage in cost-reducing R&D in the non-resource sector. Further motivation is provided by the observation that resource-rich countries tend to innovate less. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) employed new natural capital data from the World Bank. They found out that resource abundance does not induce any curse. On the other hand, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) argued that the resource curse is not an entirely awed concept. They noted that natural resource price volatilities may slow down growth rates.
2 Besides the popular channels mentioned below, other hypotheses have recently emerged.
These include fractionalization and excessive investment (van der , and negative savings rates in resource-rich, developing countries (van der Ploeg, 2010).
3 Indeed, innovation has been well-regarded as an engine for economic development. For 2 historical anecdote observed that Latin American countries missed opportunities for natural resource-based growth. He argued that these countries lack the innovative capacity arising from low investments in scientic infrastructure and human capital. Empirically, using state-level US data, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) has also shown that resource abundance decreases R&D (Research and Development) expenditure.
The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, it focuses on an interesting game theoretic, innovation-based approach on the natural resource curse. Second, compared again to the innovation-based models which only regarded natural resources as an input, this study's originality comes from its consideration of resource wealth as an appropriable common pool in an informal sector. This is done by utilizing the elements of a Tullock-based contest (Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2007) . Again, the informal sector co-exists with an formal sector engaged in production, e.g. manufacturing. This formal sector is then characterized by an oligopolistic relationship among groups. Acting like entrepreneurial rms, they also engage in Cournot competition. This feature of the formal secmore detailed examples, please refer to Aghion and Howitt (2005) .
tor, e.g. manufacturing, is somehow consistent with the formalization found in d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) . Although the non-cooperative interaction among agents is the focus, the possibility of R&D cooperation is also considered. That is, groups may share basic information and eorts in the rst stage. Nonetheless, it is assumed they remain rivals in the marketplace.
As discussed in d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , a realistic example is the European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technologies. Overall, market competition is non-existent in recent static, decentralized models of the resource curse which never considered any form of market structure. Therefore, this research also provides a relatively new, yet simple insight into the relational dynamics of natural resource abundance and quantity competition. Finally, this paper incorporates the existence of technological spillovers in production. The past papers did not vary the extent of technical externalities in their models.
In this regard, it is important to notice that this current study examines the possibility that cost reductions are characterized by spillovers which may vary in magnitude.
This article has shown that the impact of natural resource abundance on income and welfare is non-monotonic. 4 The general ndings of this study are dependent on the dierent natural resource threshold levels:
1. There is a pure blessing. This only happens when both the extent of technological spillovers and the initial level of resource are low. Starting from scarcity, the increase in natural resource abundance generates a jump in the groups' income levels. Both income and welfare go up.
2. There is a pseudo-blessing. This can be observed for intermediate initial values of the natural resource. A resource boom induces an immediate increase in income. Unfortunately, the increase in aggregate income is not sucient to outweigh the losses in consumer surplus due to lower output (and higher price).
Thus, the welfare of the economy still decreases. The range of values where a pseudo-blessing occurs is greater when spillovers are high.
3. There is a double curse. This occurs for extremely high initial levels of resources. For this scenario, income and welfare both decline with a further increase in the amount of natural resource. With certainty, the decrease in income directly induces a fall in welfare. When there is a a sudden increase in wealth from natural resources, there is an intensied shifting of allocation from an innovative activity with collective benets towards unproductive contesting.
4 Note that there is a limited number of static models considering the impact of higher rents on welfare. The most prominent one is that of Torvik (2002) .
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This negative diversion eect greatly dominates the potential income gains.
Therefore, the aggregate income of the economy inevitably falls. This impact is strong enough that social welfare also suers.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic setup of the game. Meanwhile, Sections 3 and 4 discuss the potential solutions to the model. Section 5 then focuses on the comparative statics. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The setup
Extending the static setup in Wick and Bulte (2006) , consider an economy that consists of two risk-neutral groups. These groups can be regarded as conicting tribes (Hodler, 2006) or more aptly, entrepreneurial rms (Torvik, 2002) .
It is noteworthy to emphasize, however, that this model diers because it is a two-stage game where the nature of interaction diers between the two periods.
In the rst stage, each group i has an exogenous, total amount of endowment E i to be allocated between cost-reducing R&D eorts in the productive sector (e.g. manufacturing) x i and resource rent appropriation f i . In the second stage, given their prior investment decisions, the groups simultaneously set output in the productive sector. Notice that a greater market share in the second stage, i.e. capability to produce more output, provides incentives for groups to invest in cost-reducing R&D in the rst stage.
The productive, formal sector is assumed to be duopolistic in nature. It is characterized by an inverse demand function P (Q) , where Q = q i + q j = q 1 + q 2 is the total quantity produced. 5 Each group's unit cost is denoted as c i (x i , x j ) which is a function of the amount of R&D eort it invests x i and the amount of research x j that the other group undertakes. Assuming linearity, P (Q) and c i (x i , x j ) are denoted as follows: Assuming homogeneity in output q in the second stage, the group's payo from the productive sector M is denoted as:
Alternatively, in the rst stage, groups can invest in an informal sector F .
With the prevalence of weak property rights in the economy, activity in the informal sector pertains to contesting for a common pool. More specically, groups have the opportunity to capture natural resource rents. Torvik (2002) discussed that these rents can also be considered as public sector income subject to a political struggle among entrepreneurial rms. Group i's expected payo from appropriation is given by:
where R is the total value of the natural resource rent in the common pool and h i (f i , f j ) is the contest success function. It is assumed that the contest success function takes the most commonly used functional form (see Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2007).
determines the share of the natural resource rent that i will obtain, given it invests f i to appropriation and j allocates f j . In this case, h 1 = f1 f1 + f2 and h 2 = 1 − h 1 . Intuitively, the more a group invests in appropriation (in relative terms), the higher its share of the common pool. 6 For more details on the class of conict technologies, refer to Tullock (1980) , Hirshleifer 
The second stage
Conditional on the allocation decisions made in Stage 1, group i chooses the level of output that maximizes its aggegate payos from production and contesting. Adding up Equations (1) and (2), the total income of group i is denoted as:
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium can be computed to be
This result indicate that the existence of spillovers imply that one group's cost reduction eort aects the production decision of the other.
The rst stage
In the rst stage of the game, each group i has an endowment E i to be allocated between cost-reducing R&D investments in the productive sector and resource rent appropriation. It is assumed that this endowment is xed and exogenously given. Thus, if groups spend more in contesting for rents, then less is available for process innovation in the productive sector.
Given (5), Equation (4) can be written as
7 s.t.
As shown in Section 4, depending on the value of R, there can either be an interior or a corner solution. Assuming natural resources are below a given threshold, group i maximizes (6) with respect to x i such that R&D eort is positive. However, if R is too high, there might be no incentive to innovate and the endowment is fully devoted to appropriation.
Equilibrium
Dene (x N , f N ) as the strategies chosen by the group. The R&D investment and resource rent appropriation eort levels in the interior equilibrium are denoted as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1:
1. There exists a unique, symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (x
with (R) = [E +
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
In the interior equilibrium, the arbitrage condition ∂Π ∂x = ∂Π ∂a is fullled.
That is, the marginal benet of R&D investment (say, higher prots in the Given the R&D and the appropriation investments (x, f ) exhibited above, the unit cost c, total output Q, price P (Q), aggregate income 2Π, consumer surplus CS, and social welfare W of the economy can be characterized in Table 1 . For ease of reading assume that E + Interior Solution Corner Solution Cooperative Solution
Groups are worse-o when they fail to cooperate in R&D provision. Compared to the cooperative solution, the results in the interior equilibrium show that R&D investments are lower, appropriation is intensied, unit cost is higher, the total quantity produced is less, and the price is higher. Indeed, when groups play non-cooperatively, aggregate income, consumer surplus, and welfare are lower compared to the cooperative situation. Outcomes worsen when the natural resource rents are extremely high and neither group invests in cost-reducing innovation.
5 Comparative statics
Focusing on the interior equilibrium, this part discusses the various eects of a marginal change in natural resource abundance.
The eects of an increase in the resource rents on innovation eorts and production in the formal sector are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: An increased amount of natural resources reduces cost-reducing R&D investments and output in the productive sector. Thus, 1.
< 0, and 2.
The intuition for the rst result is pretty straightforward. More natural resources entails a higher common pool prize. Ceteris paribus, a marginal increase in appropriation investment may imply higher returns in the informal sector.
This makes resource rent grabbing more attractive to both groups. Hence, they shift their initial endowment away from the R&D activity. This might be further intensied by the free-riding-due to-spillovers eect. Knowing that they can benet from the R&D investment of their rival, groups may opt to free ride instead. Meanwhile, the second part of Proposition 2 shows that natural resources have an adverse impact in output. Groups engage in less productive activities in the formal sector. When R increases, the quantity produced in the second stage declines because the unit cost is higher. The formal sector's aggregate output eventually falls. Consequently, the price rises as ∂P (Q)
With these ndings, an increase in R obviously has implications on income.
Proposition 3: Income is negatively correlated to R if and only ifR > R B = (2006)). In the absence of property rights, these studies observed that there is an unconditional negative relationship between resource abundance and income. An increase in the amount of natural resources always decreases the total income of rivalling groups. The results in this study, however, imply that income only decreases if R is above a given threshold.
As stated above, this paradoxical nding can be explained by decomposing the two eects of natural resource abundance on total income. Indeed, these two opposing eects determine whether a resource curse exists or not Hence, it is a one to one increase in the economy's aggregate income. On the other hand, the indirect diversion eect reduces income as investments are reallocated from cost-reducing R&D to rent appropriation. This displacement of allocative investment can also be analyzed using the combined responses of both price and quantity. Recalling the payos for the productive formal sector, the price and quantity eects of a natural resource boom can be decomposed as follows:
∂R )q. The rst term is negative as 7 The result is the same when the aggregate income of the economy is considered. In this paper, the aggregrate income of both groups is just equal to twice the total income of each group.
shown in Proposition 1. The second term is also negative since
Therefore, prots from the formal sector is always negatively correlated with R. The negative impact of a decline in output (and the increase in unit cost) far outweighs the price increase. When this diversion eect is greater than the income gains from the informal sector, the total income of each group (and the aggregate income of the economy) falls with R.
To integrate the discussion, the resource curse indeed follows when the diversion eect dominates the income eect. When part of the initial endowment is displaced away from the R&D activity, the group foregoes a potential increase in income from the formal sector. Nonetheless, it obtains an additional share of the common pool. When ∂Π
these two opposing forces are equal. Thus, with higher R the additional rents in the informal sector obviously go up. Groups are then induced to switch to contesting until a new equilibrium is reached.
Meanwhile, Peretto (2012) emphasized that the literature on the resource curse should not presume that income growth is equivalent to welfare. Providing contrasting support, this study now develops a static, yet convincing nding that the impact of a resource boom on income and welfare dier. As to be explained later on, the negative correlation between natural resources and welfare comes rst when rents are above a given threshold, R C . The peak of the relationship between natural resources and income only happens when R > R B > R C . Dening welfare as the sum of the groups' income and consumer surplus, Proposition 4 formalizes this result.
Proposition 4: Depending on the initial amount of natural resources and the extent of spillovers, an increase in resource rents may negatively aect welfare.
2b. Finally, when 0.5 ≤ β < 1,
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
As shown in Table 2 , focus is given to the scenario where the parameter for technological spillovers is 0 < β < 0. Region III, on the other hand, has almost the same results as in II. What diers is that the total income of each group now decreases with R. A double curse is observed as welfare also declines. The impact of higher natural resource rents is negative on both aggregate income (producer surplus) and consumer surplus. As already discussed above, the groups' income levels fall because the negative diversion eect of a resource boom dominates the positive gains in income. Hence, the always negative impact of resource abundance on consumer surplus is amplied. This negative correlation between resource rents and consumer surplus is supported by Proposition 2. Due to lower cost-reducing R&D investments, outputs fall. The decline in the total quantity produced, in turn, increases price P (Q). Consequently, when there is a marginal increase in R, the consumer surplus always decreases. In summary, results for Region III
Impact of R
show that groups experience the a double curse. Both income ans welfare fall with a rise in natural resource rents. 14 There are several potential extensions to the current model. First, to provide value-added to the analysis one may suppose asymmetry among more than two groups. Second, a game with dynamic R&D can also be considered. These extensions are parts of the author's future research agenda.
Appendix A.1: Proof of Proposition 1
Groups maximize Equation (6) with respect to x i such that constraint (7) is met.
Assuming symmetry among groups,
To ensure that cost-reducing R&D eort x i is non-negative, the following condition (necessary and sucient) must be met:
2(β+1)(2−β) > 0. If (R)>0, then x>0 if natural resource rents are below a given threshold R A . Otherwise, x = 0 (i.e. nobody invests in R&D) and the initial endowment is fully devoted to appropriation, E = f . More specically, the following should be satised to ensure the R&D eorts are positive: To determine the sign of ∂Π Y (R) ∂R , the sign of the last term must be known.
For the resource curse to occur, it must be negative. That is, √ (7 − 5β) < 
< R.
The left-hand side is negative if 0.5 ≤ β < 1. In this case, R > 0 is always satised. Therefore, when 0.5 ≤ β < 1 (i.e. when technological spillovers are very high), welfare is always negatively correlated with the amount of natural resources. If 0 < β < 0.5 (low extent of spillovers), R should be higher a given threshold, to induce a fall in welfare.
